That firm seems quite suspicious, so I'd hold my breath for a bit longer and wait for more details. All the exploits mentioned require admin privileges, which also allows you to modify signed drivers without Windows noticing (which is what the Pixel Clock Patcher does) or flash manipulated hard drive firmware. I doubt that many of these devices have proper validity/certificate checks, at least my DVD drive has none. Since I have an unpatched 7200U Intel laptop, I think I should really take a deeper look at those Management Engine exploits. I wonder if these flaws have rendered Software Guard Extensions useless Of course, every additional security issue makes it easier to find viable attack vectors, especially for attacks targeting larger groups of persons/organisations. And with encrypted and undocumented code running with such privileges (and hardware in general as Spectre and Meltdown have showed), users become more and more dependant on the 'goodwill' and competence of a couple of firms.